Max Abrahms has published a fascinating paper showing the ineffectiveness of terrorism as a strategic political tool, particularly when civilians are targeted:

This study analyzes the political plights of twenty-eight terrorist groups— the complete list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) as designated by the U.S. Department of State since 2001. The data yield two unexpected findings. First, the groups accomplished their forty-two policy objectives only 7 percent of the time. Second, although the groups achieved certain types of policy objectives more than others, the key variable for terrorist success was a tactical one: target selection. Groups whose attacks on civilian targets outnumbered attacks on military targets systematically failed to achieve their policy objectives, regardless of their nature. These findings suggest that (1) terrorist groups rarely achieve their policy objectives, and (2) the poor success rate is inherent to the tactic of terrorism itself. Together, the data challenge the dominant scholarly opinion that terrorism is strategically rational behavior.

In his analysis Abrahms argues that the low strategic success rate is due to Correspondence Interference. Correspondence Interference theory states that one interprets the intentions of others based upon their actions. For instance, you observe a young man waving a baseball bat at a clerk behind the counter at a 7-11. You infer that he is trying to rob the establishment. In actuality, this may be two friends engaged in horseplay. Abrahms states that terrorists acts, particularly those targeting civilians, create a high level of correspondence and foment an all-or-nothing ideological struggle in the minds of those attacked. For instance, prior to the events of 9/11 it was generally understood that Osama bin Ladin’s primary goal was the removal of US forces from Saudi Arabia, and then from the greater Middle East. Whether or not these goals were ever achievable is inconsequential. After the attacks of 9/11 the intent of bin Laden in the public mind became to destroy the United States. As President Bush reiterated on the 5th anniversary of the attacks,

The war against this enemy is more than a military conflict. It is the decisive ideological struggle of the 21st century, and the calling of our generation.

The overall effect of terrorism against civilians maximalizes ideological differences of any struggle making compromise or a negotiated resolution impossible. The inferred intention of the 9/11 perpetrators has become a significant political argument in the US which continues to fuel policies and actions which are antithetical to the terrorists stated goals. America’s presence in the Middle East, for instance, has dramatically increased since the attacks; whereas, the stated goal of those behind the attacks was to decrease US presence.

Abrahms argument becomes more interesting when re-interpreted to examine US policies and their effect on intended audiences and targets. While Abrahms does not engage this topic, it is, nonetheless, the next logical area to consider.

America, for instance, has a stated goal of bringing democracy and stability to Iraq. However, the net effect of our actions has left the country unstable, chaotic, and violent. One must wonder what the implied correspondence of America’s actions signified as its intentions in the Middle East. Certainly the current situation in Iraq precipitates, if not creates, a significant ideological gulf. One in which there can never be a diplomatic resolution. For if the majority of civilians in the Middle East perceive the result of America’s actions to signify its original intent then then one must believe that America is a state which seeks to destabilize the Middle East and unleash havoc upon it. Ironically, this is the goal ascribed to bin Ladin’s attack on the US. America’s actions may make it as popular in the Middle East as bin Ladin is in the Midwest.

Douglas R. Burgess has an excellent essay on why terrorists should be treated as pirates under international law. He draws several insightful parallels between both independent and state sponsored piracy and terrorism. Though this argument is not a new one, this is perhaps the best analysis I have seen for this position.

Of course, this would mean that we would have to re-define the War on Terror™, as a struggle against individual actors, some of whom receive state funding, instead of against a mythical global conspiracy. Thus, it probably won’t happen anytime soon . . .