Sleepycatz

Why America Will Not Leave Iraq

I don’t usually write about the situation in Iraq primarily because I feel that there are so many others who express my own feelings more eloquently then I seem capable of. Also, my views on the situation are a bit more pessimistic than those of most activists and pundits, and I have been told that it’s not helpful to voice such views to the public. Recently, however, there has been a lot of consternation about Gen. Petreaus’ upcoming report to congress and the question of will American forces stay in Iraq or leave. To understand the answer to this question — and US-Iraq policy in general — we have to look back nearly five years ago to the surge to war and understand the reasons and hopes surrounding the initiation of the invasion and the political philosophy which made it a necessity for this administration.

When the Bush administration came to power it had a single foreign policy goal: to establish America as the dominant world power of the 21st century. Seeing the only threat to this goal as the world’s lesser superpowers (Russia and China) the administration focused heavily in its first year on the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system (aka SDI) and on excising itself from the 1972 ABM Treaty. A deployed anti-missile system, they believed, would have given America a strategic advantage in pressing its will throughout the world for years to come. Then came September 11th, 2001.

When the administration states that 9/11 changed everything, for them, it is no hyperbole. Their notions of projecting a strong, nearly invincible, America on the world were called into question that day. The way the administration viewed it, America’s allies and enemies had seen a small, disorganized, group of fanatics cause massive damage to America’s infrastructure and economy with little money or effort.

The administration responded first by inflating the perpetrators of the attacks. For instance: as Jason Burke has pointed out, prior to 2001 al-Qaeda was a loose association of violent jihadi who received much of their funding from a Saudi businessman named Osama bin-Laden, and who rarely, if ever, used the name al-Qaeda to identify themselves. The administration, however, quickly elevated the perception of al-Qaeda as a powerful leading Islamist terrorist organization. A definition al-Qaeda was egotistically eager to adopt.

The administration’s next responded by prioritizing its original goal of a world dominated by America; however, direct action was now necessary in addition to simple coercion. In 2003 during an interview with Charlie Rose, columnist Thomas Friedman said:

I think it [the invasion of Iraq] was unquestionably worth doing, Charlie.
We needed to go over there, basically, um, and um, uh, take out a very big state right in the heart of that world and burst that bubble, and there was only one way to do it.

Despite Friedman’s lack of eloquence, his viewpoint was shared by most Americans, but particularly so by those who believed in the one-world, one-superpower philosophy of the administration. In order to save-face and press America’s will around the world a strategic invasion was needed. Afghanistan provided little global strategic value, but Iraq was the goldmine. The perfect choice to begin a Pax-Americana.

The notion of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was never the primary reason for its invasion - Dick Cheney alluded to this fact nearly a year ago. Rather as a geo-strategic goal, the subjugation of Iraq as a client state would present America with significant leverage not only the Middle-East, but which could be used against any state questioning its authority. Geographically, bases in Iraq would allow ground forces quick access to Iran, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, and air forces tactical access to Russia and the former Soviet client states. Coupled with the deployment of SDI in Iraq, and perhaps Turkey, American military power would become the dominant force throughout western Asia. Aside from geographic tactical advantages, Iraq also possessed huge reserves of oil. The strategic value to influence world oil prices cannot be understated. Many economists and historians have noted, that low oil prices played a major role in the dissolution of the Soviet state. As, former Russian Prime Minister, Yegor Gaidar wrote:

The timeline of the collapse of the Soviet Union can be traced to September 13, 1985. On this date, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the minister of oil of Saudi Arabia, declared that the monarchy had decided to alter its oil policy radically. The Saudis stopped protecting oil prices, and Saudi Arabia quickly regained its share in the world market. During the next six months, oil production in Saudi Arabia increased fourfold, while oil prices collapsed by approximately the same amount in real terms.

As a result, the Soviet Union lost approximately $20 billion per year, money without which the country simply could not survive.

With the ability to influence world oil prices, America could exert economic pressure on Russia, Iran, and Venezuela. All states this administration sees as growing threats to American influence.

Additionally, the Bush administration, and it’s mentors, viewed Iraq as an easy conquest. Iraq was a modern secular state which had been economically depressed by years of war with Iran and international sanctions. It was believed that a ‘liberation’ would lead to an Iraqi golden age of economic revival under an America guided government.

The reasons for the massive administration failures in Iraq have been well documented. Overall, the administration has relied far too much on politics and philosophy in its actions; rather, than analyzing and rationally responding to a dynamic situation. In other words, they allowed their own ideological optimism to cloud their every judgment. This was coupled with a media which simply reflected and amplified their optimism and created a feedback loop for disaster.

It must be understood, above all, that there exists some political-philosophical truth in everything this administration says about the situation in Iraq. For instance, the administration has claimed upon numerous occasions that should America withdraw forces from Iraq that the ‘terrorists will win’ and ‘they will be embolden’ to ‘attack America’. If we set aside the rhetoric of fear and analyze these statements as elements of the foreign policy discussed above we can find the political truth of them. In the minds of this administration, if America would leave Iraq it would signal a massive loss of America’s prestige and influence. To withdraw is to indicate that you are no longer a super-power whose will can be exerted unilaterally. This administration has viewed, correctly in some sense, that the ultimate goal of Islamic terrorist groups is to undermine and reduce American influence in the Middle East, and throughout the rest of the world. Within the philosophy of the administration, and for its followers, this is tantamount to destroying America. The ‘terrorists’ would ‘win’ if America’s influence in the region was reduced, and anything which undermines the pressing of American will upon the rest of the world is, in essence, an attack upon America.

The administration’s philosophy suggests a naturalistic approach, in which it is understood that one state must, in some sense, exert dominance over others. This ideology strengthens the state, allowing it to believe providence has set it apart and above others. It engenders, what Freud referred to as a “narcissistic satisfaction provided by the cultural ideal” amongst the citizens, bonding them together in unity of vision. This administration, and most American politicians, cannot envision a world in which America is less then the leading global power. In particular, the philosophy of this administration holds that Americans would cease to find meaning or value in their country should America loose status.

When I began writing this entry — about a week or so ago — I was going to predict that President Bush would evoke the specter of the Vietnam war before Gen. Petreaus made his report. This has since come to pass, a bit sooner then I had anticipated. Nonetheless, this should come as no surprise to anyone who understands the political-philosophy which drives this administration. For them, America’s withdraw from Vietnam represented the greatest defeat of superpower-America that had ever occurred. The withdraw has been seen by all in this administration and its supporters as an incalculable blow to American influence throughout the world. They blame the withdraw for Soviet Gains in the 1970s, the 1973 oil embargo, and Iranian Coup. The belief remains that a strong American influence could have averted or mitigated any of these events. But that strength was lost in our withdraw from Vietnam. Additionally, it must be understood that these supporters do not believe that America’s loss in Vietnam was a military defeat; rather, they view it as a cultural defeat. They believe that the generation which was to fight the war had lost it sense of meaning and value of the state. They blame this loss on everything from Soviet influence to the stalemate of the Korean conflict. But we must remember that for this administration, America has never ceased to be the preeminent superpower; that Vietnam was simply a setback to America’s influence and prestige. One which needed to be rectified with action.

By understanding the hopes and philosophy which drove this administration into Iraq, we can understand why they will never abandon it. Far too much, for them, rides on Iraq. They still believe they will maintain their military bases and have some influence on oil production. To withdraw signals a loss of American power and a defeat of American influence. They view Nixon’s withdraw from Vietnam as a lack of willpower, and believe they have learned the lessons of history. This administration will stay in Iraq regardless of the cost because they believe the future of America as a superpower depends upon it. Every strange or bizarre historical analogy they make to the conflict in Iraq is done in an effort to highlight a time of perceived American greatness — a point in history in which America either rose to a difficult military task or emerged victorious. The only exception to this is its recent reference to Vietnam, which is invoked as a warning to America that greatness must be desired and requires sacrifice.

It is my, unfortunate. opinion that most politicians will come to the same conclusion as Mr. Bush. Few of them have the courage to carry out a policy which would reduce America’s global status. If Vietnam is any historical indicator, a withdraw from Iraq would create a need to regain influence by exerting American will somewhere closer to home. In the past this has been Central or South America. The issue which should upset all Americans, however, is that we were never consulted as to what we believe the role of our country in the world should be. This is the question which is considered far too serious and important to be left to citizens or voters. Yet, it is the question which drives our foreign policies which create blow-back towards America throughout the world. The question is perhaps the most important one which can be asked of a citizen, which is ‘what does it mean to be American?’ It is to be the moral and military authority of the world? Or is it something closer to our ideals and our lives?

postscript

There has been some discussion of the need for Mr. Bush to withdraw troops within the next six months. This is an inevitability. Our current military is far too stretched and undermanned to maintain the current troop levels in Iraq. In order to maintain a force, Mr. Bush must seek one of two options: a general draft, or an increased use of private military forces. I do not believe a draft is a possibility, as it would invite far too much scrutiny from the public into the use of military force. Thus, I believe we will see a greater use of private military forces for combat duty. Cynically, one might suggest that a significant American withdraw would lead the administration to utilize these smaller private firms to continue to destabilize Iraq after a significant withdraw. This would help create the impression that the situation is hopeless beyond any country’s influence, even America’s.

Mahablog has excellent post of interpreting Bush’s recent use of Vietnam

Digby has a very good post on the manipulation of media by the Surge machine

This entry was posted by steve on Wednesday, September 5th, 2007 at 2:46 am and is filed under Misc. Ramblings, Politics. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.